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Inetianbor and Green: How Two
Payday Loan Disputes Illustrate the
Integrality Rule’s Incompatibility with
the FAA
Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 768 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2014).
CAMERON C. LINCOLN*

I. INTRODUCTION
The integrality rule1 is a rule grounded in the analysis of party intent and allows for an arbitration agreement to be vitiated if the selected forum is unavailable
and the forum was integral to the agreement. The integrality rule, conceived in
1990, has a short history, and while it is followed by several federal appellate
circuits, it is not consistently named or referenced.2 The Eleventh Circuit applied
the rule in Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc.,3 where the court precluded arbitration due
to the integrality rule.4 This case raises questions of whether the integrality rule
contradicts the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),5 whether it overrides the parties’
decision to arbitrate their disputes, and whether it runs counter to the Supreme
Court’s insistence that courts should not add obstructions to arbitration beyond the
FAA.6 When Inetianbor is contrasted with the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion in
Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill, LLC,7 the integrality rule’s incompatibility with
the FAA is evident. Further, the integrality rule acts as a non-textual addition to
the FAA which creates unnecessary delay, expense, and ambiguity in dispute
resolution.

* Cameron C. Lincoln is a third year law student at the University of Missouri School of Law.
1. The integrality rule is not officially named outside of this note, but is named the integrality rule
for the purposes of both brevity and specificity. The integrality rule allows for arbitration to be precluded in its entirety if the forum selected in the arbitration clause is unavailable and the forum was
integral to the agreement to arbitrate. See Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 742
F.Supp. 1359 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
2. Id.
3. Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 768 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, Cashcall, Inc. v.
Inetianbor, 135 S. Ct. 1735 (2015).
4. Id. at 1354.
5. Id. at 1349; 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. The FAA governs arbitration and has provisions for correcting
deficiencies in an arbitration agreement, which the use of the integrality rule potentially overrides.
6. See Am. Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013).
7. Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2013). The Seventh Circuit
declined to follow the integrality rule, instead utilizing the FAA’s § 5 substitution clause to replace the
forum provision with a different forum. Id.
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Abraham Inetianbor borrowed $2,600 from Western Sky Financial, LLC in
January 2011.8 CashCall, Inc. (CashCall), served as loan servicer and collector.9
Inetianbor paid $3,252.65 to CashCall over a one-year period in monthly installments.10 Inetianbor believed he had fully repaid the loan, but CashCall disagreed
and sent a bill the following month, which Inetianbor refused to pay.11 CashCall
reported Inetianbor’s default to credit agencies, which resulted in a significant
decline in Inetianbor’s credit score.12
Inetianbor sued CashCall for defamation, usury, and violations of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)13 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.14 CashCall responded by moving to compel arbitration
under the terms of the loan agreement.15 The loan agreement stated that any dispute would be resolved through arbitration by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal
Nation (Tribal Nation) via a tribal elder, an authorized tribal representative, or a
panel using the tribe’s consumer dispute rules.16 The district court granted CashCall’s motion to compel arbitration.17
Inetianbor attempted to comply with the court’s order, but the Tribal Nation
sent Inetianbor a letter explaining that it does not authorize arbitrations.18 Since
the forum selected in the loan agreement was unavailable, Inetianbor brought the
case in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.19 The
district court ruled that the forum selection clause was integral to the agreement to
arbitrate and that the unavailability of the specified forum rendered the arbitration
clause unenforceable.20 The district court reversed its previous holding, deeming
that the forum was available because CashCall showed that the Tribal Nation allowed arbitration in a contractual agreement, but the Tribal Nation did not involve
itself in the actual arbitration process.21 Inetianbor again attempted to comply
with the district court’s order and again was confounded.22 He returned to the
district court with evidence that the Tribal Nation was completely uninvolved in
8. Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1348.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2012).
14. Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1347. See also Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (S.D.
Fla. 2013).
15. Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1348.
16. Id. “Mr. Inetianbor ‘agree[s] that any Dispute ... will be resolved by Arbitration, which shall be
conducted by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation by an authorized representative in accordance
with its consumer dispute rules and the terms of this Agreement.’” Id.
17. Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1305 (S.D. Fla. 2013).
18. Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc. 2013 WL 2156836 at *3 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (“[T]he Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe ... does not authorize Arbitration as defined by the American Arbitration Association
(“AAA”) here on the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation located in Eagle Butte, SD 57625.”).
19. Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1348.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1348-1349. “The [Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal] Court does not provide arbitration. Arbitration, as in a contractual agreement, is permissible. However, the Court does not involve itself in the
hiring of the arbitrator or setting dates or time for the parties. After there is an arbitration award, the
parties may seek to confirm the award in Tribal Court.” Inetianbor, 2013 WL 2156836 at 7.
22. Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1349.
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the arbitration process.23 The district court reverted to its original holding that the
forum was unavailable and therefore refused to compel arbitration.24
CashCall appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, challenging the
rule established in Brown v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp.25 that arbitration cannot be compelled when the forum selection clause is integral to the agreement and
when the forum is unavailable.26 Additionally, CashCall argued that the forum
selection clause was not integral in this case and that the district court erred in
finding that the forum was unavailable.27 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to preclude arbitration because the forum selection clause
was integral to the agreement and the required forum, the Tribal Nation, was not
an available forum.28

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A.

The FAA and the Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) states that any written agreement to arbitrate is “valid, enforceable, and irrevocable,” unless grounds for revocation of
contract under law or equity apply.29 As with all valid contracts, courts are tasked
with enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms.30 When a party
refuses to proceed with arbitration, the FAA provides that district courts must
order the parties to proceed to arbitration “in accordance with the terms of the
agreement.”31 If the agreement does not contain a method for selecting an arbitrator, if a party fails to use that method, or if lapses occur in obtaining an arbitrator,
the FAA allows the courts to designate an arbitrator whose participation is governed by the terms of the agreement as if the arbitrator had been designated by the
agreement.32 The FAA, however, does not contain a provision detailing how to
proceed when the arbitration agreement designates a specific arbitration forum in
the terms of the arbitration agreement and that forum is unavailable.33 In certain

23. Id. Mr. Chasing Hawk (the chosen arbitrator) stated at a preliminary arbitration hearing:
“…because ‘this is a private business deal, [t]he Tribe has nothing to do with any of this business.’” Id.
at 1354. See also Inetianbor, 2013 WL 2156836 at *2 (indicating that Robert Chasing Hawk was
selected by the Tribe to arbitrate the dispute).
24. Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1349.
25. Id. Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Only if the
choice of forum is an integral part of the agreement to arbitrate, rather than an ‘ancillary logistical
concern’ will the failure of the chosen forum preclude arbitration.”) (quoting Zechman v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 742 F.Supp. 1359, 1364 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (internal citations omitted)).
26. Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1349.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1354.
29. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
30. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011). See also Am. Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S.Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013). The Court expressed in both cases the requirement that courts enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms, rendering their interpretation essentially the same as any other contractual agreement.
31. 9 U.S.C. §4 (2012).
32. 9 U.S.C. §5 (2012).
33. Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1349 (“The question this case presents is what to do when the principle
that arbitration is a matter of contract comes into conflict with §5’s substitution provision.”). Section 5
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instances, federal circuit courts have deemed the entire arbitration agreement unenforceable.

B.

When Arbitration is Precluded

The Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of arbitration preclusion in Brown v.
ITT Consumer Financial Corp.34 In Brown, plaintiff Stanley Brown filed a complaint against ITT for racial discrimination with the Employment Equal Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in early 1993.35 Brown was terminated in August
1993 and was offered a severance package if he signed a release of his claims
against ITT.36 Instead of signing the release, Brown brought suit, and ITT moved
to compel arbitration under the terms of Brown’s employment agreement. The
employment agreement required disputes between employees and ITT to be resolved through arbitration under the rules supplied by the National Arbitration
Forum (NAF).37 Brown argued that the employment agreement had been superseded by the benefits summary he had received at his termination and also by
several bulletins released by ITT during his employment.38 Additionally, Brown
argued that arbitration should be precluded because NAF no longer existed.39 The
district court ordered the case to proceed to arbitration where Brown’s claims
were denied.40 Brown then moved to vacate the award, and the district court denied his motion.41
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, Brown argued that the arbitration agreement should be void because the specified arbitrator and the specified arbitration
procedure no longer existed.42 The court found Brown’s argument unpersuasive
because the FAA’s substitution clause allowed courts to name substitute arbitrators.43 The court, following the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois’s decision in Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,44
concluded that the unavailability of the specified forum will only preclude arbitra-

of the FAA does allow substitution for deficiencies in an arbitration agreement, but does not specifically state what a court should do if the forum is stated in the agreement but is unavailable.
34. Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp. 211 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2000). The Eleventh Circuit
provides the most thorough cases on the subject, but other circuits followed roughly the same analysis.
See, e.g., Khan v. Dell, Inc., 669 F.3d 350 (3rd Cir. 2012), Ranzy v. Tijerina, 393 Fed.Appx. 174 (5th
Cir. 2010), and Reddam v. KPMG, 457 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2006). The Second Circuit utilized the
same reasoning, though never using the word “integral.” In re Salomon, Inc. Shareholders’ Derivative
Litigation 91 Civ. 5500 (RRP), 68 F.3d 554 (2d Cir. 2012).
35. Brown, 211 F.3d at 1220.
36. Id.
37. Id. “ITT and the employee ‘agree that any dispute between them or claim by either against the
other or any agent or affiliate of the other shall be resolved by binding arbitration under the Code of
Procedure of the National Arbitration Forum . . . .’” Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1220-21.
40. Brown, 211 F.3d at 1221.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1222. See 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012).
44. Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 742 F.Supp. 1359, 1364 (N.D. Ill.
1990). (“If, on the other hand, it is clear that the failed term is not an ancillary logistical concern but
rather is as important a consideration as the agreement to arbitrate itself, a court will not sever the
failed term from the rest of the agreement and the entire arbitration provision will fail.”).
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tion when the forum is an integral part of the arbitration agreement.45 The Eleventh Circuit determined that there was no evidence to suggest that the NAF was an
integral part of the agreement to arbitrate between Brown and ITT.46

C.

When the Forum is Integral to the Arbitration Agreement

The question of whether a specified forum or procedure is an integral part of
the arbitration agreement rather than “an ancillary logistical concern”47 may be
answered by reading the language of the arbitration agreement to determine
whether the parties intended the arbitration to be performed exclusively by the
forum or process specified.48 In the Eleventh Circuit, the language of the contract
is considered the best evidence of the intent of the parties to an agreement and is
interpreted based on its plain meaning.49 Further, the intent of the parties supersedes the federal policy favoring arbitration.50
Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc. addressed whether a
specified forum is integral to an arbitration agreement.51 In Zechman, the plaintiff
was terminated from his employment at Merrill Lynch.52 Zechman filed suit,
alleging his termination was retaliation for his objection to certain practices he
believed violated federal commodities exchange regulations.53 Merrill Lynch
moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the Chicago Board of Trade’s (CBOT)
Rule 600, to which both parties were subject, and to dismiss Zechman’s claims.54
Since the motion to compel arbitration, if granted, would have made the motion to
dismiss moot, the court addressed the arbitration motion first.55
The CBOT’s Rule 600 stated, “[a]ny controversy between parties who are
members and which arises out of the Exchange business of such parties shall, at
the request of any such party, be submitted to arbitration in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Board.”56 Both parties conceded that Rule 600 was a
valid arbitration agreement, and Zechman filed a claim with the CBOT, submit45. Id.
46. Brown, 211 F.3d at 1212. The court seemed reluctant to state that the court may always substitute a different arbitrator or rule, and instead opted to refrain from overriding the intent of the parties to
the contract.
47. Id.
48. In re Salomon, Inc. Shareholder’s Derivative Litigation 91 Civ. 5500 (RRP), 68 F.3d 554, 560561 (2d Cir. 2012). This Second Circuit case is cited by the Eleventh Circuit in support of its holding
in the instant decision. Additionally, the Second Circuit discusses several Eleventh Circuit cases in
reaching its conclusion in In re Salomon. See e.g. Luckie v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 999
F.2d 509 (11th Cir. 1993).
49. Rose v. M/V “Gulf Stream Falcon”, 186 F.3d 1345, 1350 (11th Cir. 1999) (“It is well settled that
the actual language used in the contract is the best evidence of the intent of the parties and, thus, the
plain meaning of that language controls.”).
50. Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d 1204, 1214 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Even though there is
a presumption in favor of arbitration, the courts are not to twist the language of the contract to achieve
a result which is favored by federal policy but contrary to the intent of the parties.”).
51. Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith. 742 F.Supp. 1359, 1364 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
While not an Eleventh Circuit case, Zechman is cited in both Brown and Inetianbor as well as the
Second Circuit. See In re Salomon, Inc. Shareholder’s Derivative Litigation 91 Civ. 5500, 68 F.3d 554
(2d Cir. 2012)
52. Zechman, 742 F.Supp. at 1361.
53. Id.at 1362.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1362-63.
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ting the dispute to arbitration by the CBOT.57 Merrill Lynch urged the CBOT not
to hear Zechman’s claims due to CBOT’s direct financial interest in the dispute’s
resolution.58 CBOT declined to arbitrate the dispute, and Merrill Lynch moved to
compel arbitration of all of Zechman’s arbitrable claims under Rule 600 before a
neutral arbitrator rather than the CBOT.59 Zechman argued that both parties were
governed by the terms of Rule 600, and therefore the court could not substitute
another arbitrator.60
The court looked to the intent of the parties and interpreted the language of
the agreement to discern whether the CBOT was integral to the agreement to arbitrate.61 The court concluded that, “to the extent the court can infer that the essential term of the provision is the agreement to arbitrate,” the agreement would be
enforced despite any deficient terms.62 The agreement did not specifically state
that the CBOT must be the arbitrator, only that the dispute be arbitrated according
to the regulations “prescribed by” the CBOT.63 Therefore, naming a neutral arbitrator would not necessarily violate the agreement’s requirement that arbitration
be conducted according to the CBOT’s regulations.64 The court concluded that
the agreement was foremost an agreement to arbitrate, rather than an agreement to
have the arbitration before a particular arbitrator.65 Therefore, the court granted
Merrill Lynch’s motion to compel arbitration.66
Three additional cases, Reddam v. KPMG, LLP,67 Khan v. Dell,68 and Blinco
v. Green Tree Servicing LLC,69 help to clarify the manner in which courts determine whether a forum can be substituted. In all three cases, the forums were
found to be non-integral, and arbitrators were substituted by the courts.70 In Reddam and Khan, only the procedural rules for forum selection were stipulated in the
arbitration agreements, but no forums were actually selected.71 In Blinco, the
arbitration agreement lacked any specific rules, procedures, or specified forum,
and the Eleventh Circuit supplied those specifics under the FAA’s § 5 substitution
provisions.72

57. Id. at 1363.
58. Zechman, 742 F.Supp. at 1363.What this financial interest entailed is not explained in the published opinion.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1364.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1365.
64. Zechman, 742 F.Supp. at 1365.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1374.
67. Reddam v. KPMB, LLP, 457 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2006) abrogated by Atlantic Nat’l Trust LLC
v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 621 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2010). Reddam was abrogated with regard to the postremoval-event doctrine for reviewing remands due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the
remand is due to events that occurred post removal to a federal court.
68. Khan v. Dell, 669 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2012)
69. Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 400 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2005).
70. Reddam, 457 F.3d at 1061; Khan, 669 F.3d at 357; Blinco, 400 F.3d at 1313.
71. Reddam, 457 F.3d at 1059; Khan, 669 F.3d at 355.
72. Blinco, 400 F.3d at 1312-13.
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History and Criticism of the Integrality Rule

The integrality rule’s first appearance was in Zechman,73 and was derived
from the holding of National Iranian Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc.74 Iranian Oil
involved a contract dispute between two oil companies, National Iranian Oil Co.
(NIOC) and Ashland Oil, Inc. (Ashland).75 NIOC and Ashland had an arbitration
provision that required arbitration to be conducted in Iran under Iranian law.76
Due to the 1976 coup in Tehran and the danger to Americans that persisted at the
time, Ashland refused to arbitrate in Iran, and NIOC instead attempted to compel
arbitration in Mississippi.77 The task for the Fifth Circuit was to determine
whether the forum selection clause was severable from the rest of the arbitration
agreement.78 To reach a conclusion, the court relied on the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts79 which required that NIOC show that the forum selection was merely a minor consideration while the essence of the provision was the agreement to
arbitrate their disputes.80
The court concluded that the contract’s language showed a clear intent to arbitrate under the laws of Iran with Iran as the situs of the arbitration.81 Therefore,
the forum selection clause was not severable, and the arbitration agreement was
unenforceable.82
Zechman took the analysis in Iranian Oil a step further and applied the term
“integral” to the determination of whether the choice of forum is more than a minor consideration or “ancillary logistical concern.”83 The court in Zechman actually distinguished its case from that of Iranian Oil, noting that the distinct nature
of the circumstances surrounding the agreement between NIOC and Ashland,
73. Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 742 F.Supp. 1359, 1364 (N.D. Ill.
1990) (“Where one term of an arbitration agreement has failed, the decision between substituting a
new term for the failed provision and refusing to enforce the agreement altogether turns on the intent
of the parties ‘at the time the agreement was executed, as determined from the language of the contract
and the surrounding circumstances.’”) (quoting Nat’l Iranian Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 817 F.2d
326, 333 (5th Cir. 1987)).
74. Nat’l Iranian Oil Co. at 333.
75. Id. at 328.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 328-31. Additionally, due to Iran not being a signatory to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, the court could not compel Ashland to arbitrate in
Iran. Id. at 331. See generally, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, Dec. 29, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 2517 (Iran is not listed as a signatory to the treaty).
78. Nat’l Iranian Oil, 817 F.2d at 333-34.
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §184 cmt. a & § 185(1) cmt. B (1981).
80. Nat’l Iranian Oil, 817 F.2d at 333-34 (“NIOC must therefore show that the essence, the essential
term, of the bargain was to arbitrate, while the situs of the arbitration was merely a minor consideration.”). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 184 cmt. a & § 185(1) cmt. b (1981).
81. Nat’l Iranian Oil, 817 F.2d at 334. “The language of the contract thus makes self-evident the
importance of Iranian law and Iranian institutions to NIOC. Therefore, the document plainly suggests
that the situs selection clause was as important to NIOC as the agreement to resolve disputes privately
through arbitration.” Id.
82. Id. at 334-35.
83. Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 742 F.Supp. 1359, 1365 (N.D. Ill.
1990) (“Indeed, it is possible that the regulations in place when Merrill Lynch and/or Zechman first
became members did not even contemplate the CBOT mechanism that Zechman now insists is so
integral to the agreement. It hardly seems likely, then, that the notion of CBOT-coordinated arbitration
proceedings motivated the arbitration agreement; the only ‘intent’ that emerges from the face of Rule
600.00 is an intent to resolve disputes through arbitration.”).
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including the political concerns and international law considerations, was not
present in Zechman.84 However, Zechman did not explicitly state what would
occur if the CBOT’s involvement had actually been essential under the terms of
the arbitration agreement. The Eleventh Circuit provided that answer in Brown.85
Regardless, the court in Zechman held that the selection of a neutral arbitrator was
allowed under the FAA’s § 5 substitution provision.86
The integrality rule has been recognized in the Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.87 In Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC,88 the Seventh Circuit
decided not to adopt the integrality rule and instead held that arbitration preclusion
is counter to the FAA’s policy favoring arbitration and § 5’s substitution provision.89 Joyce Green, the plaintiff, borrowed money from U.S. Cash Advance
(Cash Advance), a loan provider.90 She claimed that Cash Advance misstated the
loan’s interest rate in violation of the Truth in Lending Act91 and filed suit in the
Northern District of Illinois.92 The loan agreement contained an arbitration provision that required the parties to arbitrate under the procedural codes of the NAF.93
The district court held that the NAF was the exclusive arbitral forum, that it was
integral to the agreement, and that the NAF was unavailable as a forum.94 On
appeal, the Seventh Circuit examined the practice of precluding arbitration where
a forum is unavailable and found it to be invalid.95
Principally, the Seventh Circuit looked at the history of the integrality rule
and found that the rule originates in the dicta of Zechman, rather than any provision of the FAA.96 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit found that, contrary to the
United States Supreme Court’s recent line of cases,97 including American Express
Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,98 precluding arbitration on the basis of an unavailable forum is an invalid addition to the FAA that unnecessarily impedes the
arbitration process.99 The Seventh Circuit proffered an alternative method. In84. Id. at 1365-66.
85. Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1221 (11th Cir. 2000). If the forum is found
to be essential to the agreement, then arbitration is precluded.
86. Zechman, 742 F.Supp. at 1365-67.
87. The Seventh Circuit declined to adopt the integrality rule. See Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill.,
LLC, 724 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2013). The Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have all utilized the
integrality rule. See Khan v. Dell, Inc., 669 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2012), Ranzy v. Tijerina, 393 Fed.Appx.
174 (5th Cir. 2010), Reddam v. KPMG, 457 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2006), Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc.,
768 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2014). The Second Circuit utilized the same reasoning, though never using
the word “integral.” See In re Salomon, Inc. Shareholders’ Derivative Litigation 91 Civ. 5500 (RRP),
68 F.3d 554 (2d Cir. 2012).
88. Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2013).
89. Id. at 792.
90. Id. at 788.
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1606 (2012).
92. Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 2013 WL 317046 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
93. Green, 724 F.3d at 788-89 (“All disputes. . . shall be resolved by binding arbitration by one
arbitrator by and under the Code of Procedure of the National Arbitration Forum.”).
94. Id. at 789.
95. Id. at 790-93.
96. Green, 724 F.3d at 792 (“As far as we can tell, no court has ever explained what part of the text
or background of the Federal Arbitration Act requires, or even authorizes, such an approach.”).
97. Id. (“In recent years the Supreme Court has insisted that the Act not be added to in a way that
overrides contracts to resolve disputes by arbitration.”) (citing Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest.,
133 S. Ct. 2304 (2014)).
98. Am. Express, 133 S.Ct. at 2304.
99. Green, 724 F.3d at 792.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2015/iss2/11

8

Lincoln: Inetianbor and Green: How Two Payday Loan Disputes Illustrate the

No. 2]

Inetianbor and Green

445

stead of asking whether a particular forum is integral to the agreement, the Seventh Circuit stated that a court should assume that an unavailable forum is essentially the same as having selected no forum, in which case the court should substitute an arbitrator under the FAA’s § 5.100 This approach coincides with the FAA
and the Supreme Court’s policy favoring arbitration.101
The Green court’s conclusion relied heavily on several Supreme Court decisions and on three in particular. First, the Green court cited the Supreme Court’s
holding in Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc.,102 which determined that
the FAA’s vacatur and modification provisions were exclusive and admonished
courts to neither add to nor depart from the FAA.103 Second, the Seventh Circuit
relied on CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood,104 where the Supreme Court enforced
an arbitration agreement despite the forum’s unavailability,105 implying the need
to select an arbitrator via the FAA’s § 5 upon remand.106 Third, the Green court
relied on Concepcion’s holding that § 2 of the FAA establishes a liberal policy
favoring arbitration and that arbitration is fundamentally a matter of contract to be
enforced according to the agreement’s terms.107 The Concepcion case, much like
Green, also relied on the history of the FAA, including its purpose: to elevate
arbitration agreements to the same level as other contracts and to eliminate judicial hostility to arbitration.108 Based upon these three cases, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that the integrality rule is an invalid judicial addition to the FAA as the
FAA provides a means for a court to correct a deficient arbitration agreement by
substituting an arbitrator.109 Further, rendering an arbitration agreement unenforceable when both parties agreed to arbitrate runs counter to the policy favoring
arbitration.110 The drawbacks of following the integrality rule, as opposed to the
FAA’s substitution provision, are apparent when contrasted with the holding in
Inetianbor.

100. Id. (“Instead of asking whether one or another feature is ‘integral,’ a court could approach this
from a different direction and assume that a reference to an unavailable means of arbitration is equivalent to leaving the issue open. What if an arbitration clause were shorn of details? What if it did not
specify how many arbitrators, what forum, or any other administrative matters? Suppose ¶ 17 read, in
full: ‘Any disputes arising out of this contract will be arbitrated.’ Could a court then use § 5 to supply
particulars? If it could, then it would be hard to see any problem using § 5 the dispute between Green
and U.S. Cash Advance. The answer is yes.”).
101. Id. at 792-93.
102. Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
103. See generally id. at 578-84 (holding the FAA is controlling for arbitration agreements and the
judiciary’s power to supplement or restrict it is quite limited).
104. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S.Ct. 665 (2012).
105. Id. at 677, n.2.
106. Id. at 673.
107. AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (“We have described this
provision as reflecting both a ‘liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,’ and the ‘fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.’ In line with these principles, courts must place arbitration
agreements on an equal footing with other contracts, and enforce them according to their terms.”)
(citations omitted).
108. Id.
109. Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 791-92 (7th Cir. 2013).
110. Id.
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district
court’s interpretation of the arbitration agreement de novo but accepted the district
court’s findings of fact.111 The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis with the issue
of whether the forum selection clause was integral to the agreement to arbitrate.112
The court analyzed the language of the arbitration agreement to determine the
intent of the parties.113 The arbitration agreement stated that arbitration “shall be
conducted by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation.”114 Further, the court
noted that the Tribal Nation was referenced repeatedly throughout the agreement,
including the first provision of the contract, which expressly stated the entire
agreement was “subject solely to the exclusive laws and jurisdiction of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, Cheyenne River Indian Reservation.”115 Since the Tribal
Nation was included in five of the nine paragraphs of the contract, the court concluded that Western Sky, the drafter of the contract, considered arbitration by the
Tribal Nation to be an integral part of the agreement to arbitrate.116
CashCall relied on several cases to support a contrary conclusion, which the
court addressed individually. First, CashCall relied on Brown v. ITT to support
substituting an arbitrator.117 The court distinguished the instant case from Brown,
where only the procedural rules were specified in the arbitration agreement, not
the forum.118 The court found two other cases offered by CashCall, Reddam v.
KPMG, LLP119 and Khan v. Dell,120 unpersuasive for the same reasons.121 CashCall also relied on Reddam for the proposition that the arbitration agreement did
not explicitly state that the Tribal Nation was the “exclusive” forum.122 The court
found this argument unpersuasive for two reasons.123 First, the arbitration agreement in Reddam did not name any forum at all, whereas the agreement in the instant case contained multiple references to the Tribal Nation as arbitrator.124 Second, while the agreement in the instant case did not use the word “exclusive,” it
did use the word “shall,” which indicated that disputes must be arbitrated by the
Tribal Nation.125
CashCall also offered Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, in which the
Eleventh Circuit ordered arbitration and substituted the arbitrator, the forum, and
the allocation of costs.126 The court distinguished the instant case from Blinco
111. Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 768 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 2014).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1348, 1351.
115. Id. at 1351.
116. Id.
117. Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1351.
118. Id.
119. Reddam v. KPMG LLP, 457 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2006) (The arbitration agreement in Reddam
required arbitration to be conducted under the rules of the Nat’l Assoc. of Securities Dealers).
120. Khan v. Dell, Inc., 2010 WL 3283529 (D.N.J. 2010) (The specified forum was only referenced
once in the arbitration agreement in Khan).
121. Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1351.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. See Reddam, 457 F.3d at 1060.
125. Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1351.
126. Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 400 F.3d 1308, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 2005).
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because the Blinco arbitration agreement only contained a general arbitration
clause without a specified forum.127
Finally, CashCall argued that the inclusion of a severance provision in the arbitration agreement indicated an intent to arbitrate even if the agreement’s terms
were unenforceable.128 The court turned to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 184(1), which allows for terms to be severed only if they are not integral to the
agreement.129 Given that the Tribal Nation’s selection as the arbitral forum “pervades the entire arbitration agreement,” the court determined that it could not
sever the provision from the contract without “undermining the express, repeated
intent” of the parties.130 Therefore, the court concluded that the forum selection
provision was integral to the arbitration agreement.131
The court next considered whether the forum was unavailable.132 CashCall
argued that, first, the contract should not be interpreted to require the tribe to be
involved, and second, that even if the tribe’s involvement was required, the district court’s ruling was clearly erroneous.133
CashCall’s first argument required the Eleventh Circuit to review the language of the contract.134 The court reviewed the contract’s provision that arbitration “shall be conducted by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation by an authorized representative.”135 The court decided that the only reasonable interpretation
of this provision required the involvement of the tribe.136 Additionally, the first
provision of the agreement placed the agreement under the “sole subject matter
and personal jurisdiction” of the Tribal Nation.137 Therefore, the court concluded
that the Tribal Nation’s involvement was required.138
Having determined the necessity of the Tribal Nation’s involvement, the court
considered whether the district court’s determination that the Tribal Nation was
unavailable was clear error.139 The appellate court began its clear error review by
noting the letter sent from the Tribal Nation to the plaintiff which stated that the
tribe does not authorize arbitration.140 The court also considered the statement
made by one of the Tribal Nation elders whom CashCall had selected as arbitrator: “The Tribe has nothing to do with any of this business.”141 Finally, the court
concluded that since the agreement calls for arbitration to be conducted according
to the Tribal Nation’s rules for consumer dispute resolution, which did not exist,
127. Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1352 (quoting Blinco, 400 F.3d at 1310).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1353.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1353.
134. Id. (“CashCall’s first argument raises an issue of contract interpretation, which we review de
novo.”).
135. Id. (Original emphasis).
136. Id. ([A]rbitration by the tribe and before an authorized representative implies direct involvement.).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1354. A clear error standard of review requires that the district court’s
ruling stands unless “review of the record leaves” the reviewing court “‘with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” U.S. v. White, 335 F.3d 1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Coggin v Comm’r, 71 F.3d 855, 860 (11th Cir. 1996)).
140. Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1354.
141. Id.
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the Tribal Nation was not available as an arbitral forum.142 Thus, the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that the district court’s ruling that the forum was unavailable
was not clearly erroneous.143
Since the forum selection clause naming the Tribal Nation as the arbitral forum was an integral part of the agreement to arbitrate, and because the Tribal Nation was unavailable as an arbitral forum, the Eleventh Circuit held that a substitute arbitrator could not be appointed, and therefore affirmed the district court’s
ruling that arbitration could not be compelled.144

V. COMMENT
Inetianbor presents several questions regarding the validity of the integrality
rule. First, does the integrality rule contradict the FAA, specifically §§ 2 and 5?
Second, does the integrality rule violate the Supreme Court’s prohibition on adding obstructions to arbitration that restrict access or add expense and uncertainty?
An analysis of the interrelation of party intent, the FAA,145 and the Supreme
Court’s holdings on the subject,146 as well as the Seventh Circuit’s opposition to
the integrality rule, make it apparent that the integrality rule is an invalid addition
to the FAA that obstructs arbitration and adds expense and uncertainty to arbitration.147

A.

Integrality, the FAA, and Intent

The integrality rule functions as an exception to the FAA’s § 5 substitution
provision. The rule provides courts with the opportunity to refuse to appoint a
neutral arbitrator and force the parties to proceed in court, effectively adding an
additional phrase to § 5 that could read, “unless the arbitral forum was an essential
part of the agreement to arbitrate.”148 The Eleventh Circuit in Inetianbor had to
determine the parties’ intent in applying the integrality rule.149 Some evidence
exists that the Tribal Nation’s involvement in the arbitration was of great importance to CashCall, the party that drafted the boilerplate contract that Western
Sky provided to Inetianbor.150 However, the Tribal Nation’s involvement was
likely not essential for Inetianbor. The facts suggest Inetianbor had no connection
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. (Judge Restani entered a concurring opinion stating that the arbitration agreement should be
held invalid on grounds of unconscionability).
145. 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-16 (2012).
146. See Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 2013 WL 317046 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Green v. U.S.
Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2013); Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Peirce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 742 F.Supp. 1359 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
147. See supra part III. sec. D.
148. The modified 9 U.S.C. § 5 would read: “. . . .the court shall designate and appoint an arbitrator
or arbitrators or umpire, as the case may require, who shall act under the said agreement with the same
force and effect as if he or they had been specifically named therein unless the arbitral forum was an
essential part of the agreement to arbitrate; and. . . .” (emphasis added).
149. Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 792 (7th Cir. 2013).
150. Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1363 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (“Plaintiff asserts that
Western Sky affiliates itself with the tribe and uses tribal law in an attempt to evade state and federal
consumer protection laws.”). See also Nat’l Ass’n of Consumer Bankr. Attorneys as Amici Curiae
supporting Appellee, Moses v. CashCall Inc., 781 F.3d 63 (4th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1195).
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to the Tribal Nation. Rather than asking whether the Tribal Nation repeatedly
appeared in the contract, the court instead should have asked whether the agreement was written such that the parties clearly preferred litigation to arbitration
provided by anyone other than the Tribal Nation. Had the Eleventh Circuit ordered the district court to select a neutral arbitrator, the appellate court would have
ensured compliance with the FAA, the parties would have proceeded to arbitration, and they would have been spared the time and expense of more litigation.
CashCall petitioned for certiorari,151 adding further delay and further expense to a
case arising out of a loan for a mere $2,525.152 Further, CashCall’s appeal calls
into question the court’s conclusion that the parties considered the forum integral
to the agreement.
Additionally, the integrality rule’s relationship with § 2’s policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements is complex. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized a “liberal policy” favoring arbitration, but the Court has also
stated that arbitration agreements are creatures of contract to be treated equally
with other contracts.153 The extent to which the common law of contract applies is
unclear. The Supreme Court’s analysis of § 2 of the FAA concerns enforceability
and elevating arbitration to the same status as other contracts.154 Indeed, the FAA
was enacted for that very purpose, and to thereby eradicate judicial hostility to
arbitration.155
The Supreme Court has created boundaries for courts when examining arbitration agreements. In Concepcion, the Court held that an arbitration agreement
can be declared unenforceable for the same reasons that exist for the revocation of
all contracts, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, but not for reasons specific only to arbitration.156 Additionally, as the Hall St. decision stated, the judiciary is not allowed to add or take away from the exclusive province of the FAA.157
The section of the FAA with the most judicial leeway is § 5, which grants district
courts discretion to substitute arbitrators in the event that the arbitration agreement
does not.158 Other sections of the FAA are far less open to judicial interpretation,
such as §§ 10 and 11, which provide the exclusive means for modifying, vacating,
or confirming an arbitration award.159 Yet, the Supreme Court in CompuCredit
had no issue remanding the case to the district court for § 5 purposes when the
NAF was unavailable.160 No integrality analysis was performed in CompuCredit,

151. CashCall filed a petition for writ of certiorari, Dec. 31, 2014, which was denied. CashCall, Inc.
v. Inetianbor, 135 S.Ct. 1735 (11th Cir. 2015).
152. Inetianbor, 923 F. Supp. 2d at 1360.
153. See Green, 724 F.3d at 787-801.
154. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S.Ct. 665, 668-669 (2012); AT&T Mobility, LLC v.
Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011).
155. See CompuCredit Corp., 132 S.Ct. at 668; Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1745.
156. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1743 (“The final phrase of § 2, however, permits arbitration agreements to be declared unenforceable ‘upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract.’ This saving clause permits agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by ‘generally
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability,’ but not by defenses that
apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at
issue.) (citations omitted).
157. Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 2013 WL 317046 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
158. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012).
159. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (2012).
160. Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattell, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 578-84 (2008).
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since the case focused on whether the statutory claims were arbitrable rather than
the availability of the forum.161
Taken as a whole, the FAA contains nothing in its text to suggest that a court
can preclude arbitration on the basis of an unavailable forum. To the contrary, the
FAA includes a provision that allows for deficiencies in the agreement to be rectified so that arbitration may proceed.162 The justification for the integrality rule is
not found in the FAA. Instead, the rule is an addition made through the common
law of contract, impermissibly invading the exclusive province of the FAA.

B.

Integrality and Supreme Court Non-Addition Policy

The Supreme Court has prohibited courts from adding to or departing from
the FAA on at least two occasions. In Hall Street163 and American Express v.
Italian Colors Restaurant, the Supreme Court prohibited the addition of restrictions or impediments to arbitration that would increase the cost or difficulty of
arbitration.164
The integrality rule does place restrictions on arbitration that increase the cost
of resolving the dispute. In the instant case, Inetianbor had been to district court
four times165 and the Eleventh Circuit once,166 and he must return to the district
court again since CashCall’s petition for certiorari was denied.167 Had the district
court used its substitution power under § 5 after the first showing that the Tribal
Nation was unavailable, the parties could have avoided the expense of multiple
appellate processes and might very well have achieved a resolution to their dispute.168 One of the purposes of arbitration is to avoid the expense of litigation.169
The integrality rule clearly can increase the expense involved.
161. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S.Ct. 665 (2012).
162. 9 U.S.C. § 5.
163. Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattell, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). The Court addressed the exclusivity
of the FAA’s modification, remittance, and vacating provision and determined them to be exclusive.
Other sections of the FAA were examined and it can be interpreted as cautioning against expanding or
restricting the FAA’s provisions.
164. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311-12 (2013).
165. Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 962 F.Supp.2d 1358 (S.D. Fla. 2013); Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc.
2013 WL 1325327 (S.D. Fla. 2013); Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 2013 WL 2156836 (S.D. Fla. 2013);
962 F.Supp. 2d 1303 (S.D. Fla. 2013). The trial court heard the case four times due to Mr. Inetianbor’s
attempts to comply with the court’s orders but being unable to do so due to the Tribal Nation’s inability to provide arbitration.
166. Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 768 F.3d at 1354 (11th Cir. 2014).
167. CashCall, Inc. v. Inetianbor, 135 S. Ct. 1735 (2015).
168. It is possible that Inetianbor might have appealed such a substitution, but there is some evidence
to suggestion that Inetianbor’s issue with arbitration was the Tribal Nation, who had ties with Western
Sky and CashCall. See Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 2013 WL 2156836*, 8 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (citations
omitted) (“Here, Plaintiff asserts that he has uncovered two new pieces of evidence that indicate that
Mr. Chasing Hawk is biased toward CashCall. First, Plaintiff claims that Mr. Chasing Hawk’s daughter, Shannon Chasing Hawk, is employed by Western Sky. Plaintiff has attached what he claims is a
printout of Ms. Chasing Hawk’s Facebook profile page, listing ‘Western Sky Financial’ as her employer. He further alleges that Mr. Chasing Hawk has “10+ kids and every single one of them has
either worked for, currently works at CashCall or one of its subsidiaries ... or had illegally attempted to
conduct an unsuccessful arbitration for the defendant.”).
169. Adam Milam, Comment: A House Built on Sand: Vacating Arbitration Awards For Manifest
Disregard of the Law, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 705, 706 (1999) (“Nevertheless, many courts have stated that
they will honor the goal of arbitration - avoidance of delay and cost of lengthy litigation - by providing
a quick and informal resolution to disputes between parties.”). See also Brent S. Gilfedder, A Mani-
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Further, the rule has the potential to be applied unpredictably.170 Determining
whether a forum selection clause in an arbitration agreement is integral to the
agreement does not have the benefit of being a bright line test. Courts have to
make this determination subjectively, based on indicia such as the number of
times the forum is mentioned, the inclusion of words such as “exclusive” or “only,” and hearings at which the parties testify as to their intent.171 The integrality
rule certainly creates additional hurdles for parties who have agreed to arbitrate
but whose contracts were not drafted in contemplation of the possibility of an
unavailable forum.172

C.

The Seventh Circuit’s Green Decision

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Green to eschew the integrality analysis in
favor of meeting the Supreme Court’s insistence that courts not place impediments on arbitration avoids the unpredictable and expensive undertakings of determining integrality while also fully supporting the FAA.173 The Seventh Circuit
reviewed the history of the integrality rule and likened its acceptance among other
courts to a rumor that is given credence without verification.174 The court proffered an alternative method for reviewing the arbitration agreement’s forum selection that inherently favored enforcement of the arbitration agreement by severing
the forum selection clause.175 In essence, the Seventh Circuit construes the FAA
and the Supreme Court’s holdings in their broadest sense and applies them to the
subject of arbitration clauses. Rather than adding a non-textual exception to § 5 of
fest Disregard for Arbitration? An Analysis of Recent Georgia Legislation Adding “Manifest Disregard of the Law” to the Georgia Arbitration Code as a Statutory Ground for Vacatur, 39 GA. L. REV.
259, 262 (2004) (“Arbitration was designed to provide a cheaper and more efficient alternative to
litigation.”).
170. Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 768 F.3d 1346, 1348-51 (11th Cir. 2014). The cases in which the
integrality rule have been applied have not been clear-cut in how the integrality of the arbitral forum
selection is determined, but rather illustrate why the forum was not integral. The Eleventh Circuit’s
analysis in Inetianbor, however, could be construed as establishing a set of factors to consider, such as
the frequency which the forum appears in the contract, the presence of language that implies exclusivity, and the inclusion of specified rules and procedures. AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131
S.Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011); Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 791-92 (7th Cir. 2013).
171. Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 768 F.3d 1346, 1348-51 (11th Cir. 2014). Party intent provides an
additional issue. The parties might not have intended a forum to be integral, but due to the way the
contract was drafted may have their agreement to arbitrate rendered unenforceable due to poor drafting. See Lawrence M. Solan, Contract as Agreement, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 353 (2007) (Solan
contrasts a subjective approach to determining contractual agreement with the objective approach
utilized by the courts).
172. This analysis considers an instance where both parties negotiate the chosen forum. However, in
a consumer arbitration context, this may not be the case. It is indeed possible that the party who provided the service to the consumer supplied the forum selection clause and the forum selection might
actually deprive the consumer of protections available in a different forum. See William W. Park,
Bridging the Gap in Forum Selection: Harmonizing Arbitration and Court Selection, 8 TRANSNAT’L L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 36-37 (1998) (“In a consumer or employment contract, however, the very
same clause might deprive an unsophisticated individual of basic procedural safeguards, imposing a
forum that is less accessible, and perhaps less sensitive to mandatory community norms such as nondiscrimination laws, than would be a court at the individual’s domicile. Thus, the value of freedom to
choose a forum (like any liberty) must be measured against the way it operates in practice.”).
173. Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., LLC, 724 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2013).
174. Id. at 792 (“[I]n the fashion of a rumor chain, later decisions picked up on and elaborated the
language of these two decisions.”).
175. Id. See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S.Ct. 665, 667 (2012).
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the FAA, the court can simply sever the incompatible features of the arbitration
clause, much like CashCall urged the Eleventh Circuit to do.176 CashCall’s contract even had a severability clause.177 By contrast, the Eleventh Circuit’s use of
the integrality rule forbade severing the provision for the same reason the court
held arbitration was precluded: the chosen arbitral forum was too pervasive, and
therefore too essential, to be severed.178 Had the case been heard in the Seventh
Circuit, the Tribal Nation forum would simply have been severed from the contract and a neutral arbitrator appointed, with much less expenditure of time and
finance and no need to engage in the difficult task of determining whether the
party intended for a forum to be integral.
The Seventh Circuit’s abandonment of the integrality rule poses the risk of
frustrating actual party intent, rather than presumed or common law intent. Parties
might actually intend for a particular forum to be the exclusive forum, even at the
cost of litigating when that forum becomes unavailable. The Seventh Circuit did
not address what would happen if an arbitration agreement were written with the
explicit language, “The parties agree to arbitrate any and all disputes with [Arbitrator/Forum], unless [Arbitrator/Forum] shall be unavailable. If unavailable, the
parties do not agree to arbitrate any dispute that shall arise under this agreement.”179 The language of § 5 of the FAA suggests that such explicit terms would
be enforced.180 Despite the risk, the absence of an integrality rule still provides
more certainty in cases where the parties’ intent is ambiguous, since the FAA’s
substitution provision can operate when parties have not provided explicit alternatives in their contract.181 The best solution would be a hybrid approach where
courts recognize the exclusivity of a forum where it is explicitly stated, but adopt
the Seventh Circuit’s approach where the language is not explicit. This hybrid
approach would promote clarity in contract drafting while avoiding additional
delays, costs, and the difficult task of interpreting contract language to determine
party intent.

VI. CONCLUSION
An analysis of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Inetianbor contrasted with
the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Green illustrates the problems inherent in the
integrality rule. Had the Green decision been controlling in Inetianbor, Inetianbor
and CashCall’s dispute would have already been resolved in arbitration rather than
remanded to the district court. The integrality rule operates as a non-textual addition to the FAA and places additional delay and expense on dispute resolution. Its
foundation in contract interpretation and severability principles is questionable.
Further, the rule is arguably counter to multiple Supreme Court rulings and the
FAA. While the opposing view in Green poses the risk of frustrating actual party
176. See Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 768 F.3d 1346, 1352 (11th Cir. 2014).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1352 (“The forum selection provision here is an ‘essential part’ of the arbitration agreement for the same reason it is integral to that agreement.”).
179. See In re Salomon, Inc. Shareholder’s Derivative Litigation. 91 Civ. 5500 (RRP), 68 F.3d 554,
561 (2d Cir. 2012) (the parties designated the NYSE as the exclusive arbitral forum, arbitrator, and
designated the NYSE’s rules to govern the arbitration).
180. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012) (“If in the agreement provision be made for a method of naming or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such method shall be followed.”).
181. Id.
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intent, it also has the benefit of reducing both delay and expense. Additionally,
the Green decision coincides with the plain language of the FAA. For these reasons, the Seventh Circuit’s decision not to adopt the integrality rule is the better
choice, especially if the Seventh Circuit recognizes exclusivity when the contract
is explicit.
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